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SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS: IS THERE AN ETHICAL OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THEY RECEIVE 
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES? 
SARAH TURK  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Derrick S
1
 is a victim of a broken system even though he is a sexually violent predator. 
He was a member of a gang, forced to participate in gang rape in order to stay in the gang and fit 
into the street lifestyle. At the time he was only seventeen but already had a string of violent 
crimes as part of his record. He was sentenced to thirty years in prison and on the day he was 
released, was transferred to a facility that houses sexually violent predators and has remained at 
the facility for nearly thirteen years. Derrick S. actively tries to seek mental health treatment in 
order to complete the steps on the road to recovery but remains stuck in the facility. A number of 
factors work against him: the stigma that is attached to the label of sex offender, lack of 
treatment, and a lack of focus within the academy on issues of bioethics as they relate to mental 
health law. These three shortcomings create a situation in which sex offenders could be 
committed indefinitely with little if any treatment in a broken system with few people advocating 
on their behalf for changes in the system and greater access to the mental health services that 
these men desperately need. 
In this paper I will examine the mental health services individuals committed under 
sexually violent predator (SVP) statutes receive during their commitment. In order to evaluate 
those services and how we view the adequacy of the mental health services these men receive, 
Part One will look at the O’Connor v. Donaldson2 case which set the standard for what could be 
                                                 
1
 Name has been changed, as this individual is currently involved in a call action lawsuit seeking 
to improve mental health treatment at the SVP facility in New Jersey.  
2
 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 563 (1975). 
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called “traditional” civil commitment3. For a point of comparison, Part Two will focus on the 
history of SVP acts and highlight the different types of mental health programs that exist in the 
country. Part Three will examine how the field of bioethics has largely shied away from mental 
illness due to the conflicting nature of autonomy and protectionism. Part Four will delve into 
how bioethics should be tackling the issue of mental health and mental illness and highlight how 
bioethics should evaluate the state and mental health services received by those men
4
 committed 
under SVP statutes. This final section will also highlight critiques of the SVP statute and 
treatment paradigm, taking into account arguments against treatment such as societal protection 
and funding issues. This section concludes that with the expansion of the power
5
 to commit these 
individuals, we are ethically obligated to provide mental health services that seek to treat the 
diseases that afflict these individuals.  
II. HISTORY OF TRADITIONAL CIVIL COMMITMENT 
The power to commit someone against his will to an institution for the treatment of a 
mental disorder is based on two main principles of Western legal tradition: parens patriae (the 
theory that the sovereign acts in the best interests of subjects who are unable to act for 
themselves
6
) and the state's police power.
7
 Involuntary civil commitment is the process by which 
                                                 
3
 Traditional in this context refers to commitment in a state against an individuals will when that 
individual is found to be mentally ill and to be a danger to themselves or others. This is in 
contrast to an SVP act which hinges on a criminal conviction of a sex offense.  
4
 In the state of New Jersey all the individuals that have been committed to the treatment facility 
in Avenel, NJ have all been male. Additionally, according to Biennial Report Regarding the 
Council on Sex Offender Treatment September 1, 2008 – August 31, 2010, all 175 SVPs were 
male.  
5
  US v. Comstock held that a federal statute allowing a district court to order the civil 
commitment, beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise be released, of a sexually dangerous 
federal prisoner was constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause. United States v. 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (176), (2010). This creates an a federal system of commitment of 
sexually violent predators in addition to state statutes.  
6
 Robert I. Simon, M.D., Clinical Psychiatry and the Law 1,158 (2d ed. 1992). 
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an individual may be committed to an inpatient mental health facility against his will by a judge, 
usually upon a showing that the individual is dangerous to himself or others, (police power). 
Alternatively, the state’s parens patriae authority is derived from English law, which, at the time 
of the settling of the American colonies, gave the King, as sovereign, the responsibility for the 
care and custody
8
 of “all persons who had lost their intellects and become incompetent to take 
care of themselves.”9 Together these two theories create a legal process that is controlled by state 
statute and affords considerable due process protection
10
 to the individual in question. For 
example, in order for the state to commit someone under the police power theory of 
commitment, the state must show by at least clear and convincing evidence
11
 that the individual 
suffers from a mental illness and is dangerous to himself or others.
12
  
One of the first cases to deal with the constitutionality of the civil commitment process 
was O’Connor v. Donaldson, decided in 1975.13 The Donaldson case was an action against the 
superintendent of a mental hospital and others for allegedly wrongfully confining the plaintiff for 
fifteen years. The Supreme Court held for the first time that “a State cannot constitutionally 
confine without more a non-dangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom 
by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.”14 The 
                                                                                                                                                             
7
 Veronica J. Manahan, When Our System of Involuntary Civil Commitment Fails Individuals 
with Mental Illness: Russell Weston and the Case for Effective Monitoring and Medication 
Delivery Mechanisms, 28 Law & Psychol Rev. 1,1 (2004). 
8
 Thomas K. Zander, Civil Commitment without Psychosis: the Law’s Reliance on the Weakest 
Links in Psychodiagnosis, 1 Journal of Sexual Offender Civil Commitment: Sci & L., 1, 17-82 
(2005). 
9
 Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill ,87 Harv. L. Rev. 1190. 88, 
(1974). 
10
 Id. at 88 
11
 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) 
12
 Manahan, supra n.7 at 4. 
13
 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 563(1975). 
14
  Donaldson 422 U.S. at 576. 
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evidence showed that Donaldson's confinement was a simple regime of enforced custodial care, 
not a program designed to alleviate or cure his supposed illness.
15
 The Court stated that even 
if Donaldson's original confinement was founded upon a constitutionally adequate basis, it could 
not constitutionally continue after that basis no longer existed because due process required the 
state to do more.
16
 Essentially the court was pointing out that if the reason for civil commitment 
was for Donaldson to receive treatment and he received the treatment curing him of his original 
illness that was reason for confinement, his confinement was no longer constitutional because he 
could not be labeled mentally disordered. In fact, in the Donaldson case, the evidence at trial 
showed that “testimony at the trial demonstrated, without contradiction, that Donaldson had 
posed no danger to others during his long confinement, or indeed at any point in his life.”17 The 
decision in Donaldson established that the only constitutionally recognized grounds for 
involuntary commitment are preventing injury to the public, ensuring the mentally ill person's 
own survival or safety, or alleviating or curing the mental illness.
18
 The court was very careful to 
say that there was no constitutional right to treatment while committed.
19
 
This paper will not address the advisability of involuntary civil commitment. The goal of 
this paper is to highlight the stigma of sexual deviance associated with individuals confined 
under an SVP act for indefinite commitment, lack of treatment, and a void in bioethical 
understanding of mental health issues. However, when the traditional civil commitment system is 
utilized appropriately, such that an ill and dangerous individual is committed to an institution 
                                                 
15
 Id at, 569. 
16
  Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) 
17
 Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 568,  
18
 Donald H. J. Hermann, Barriers to Providing Effective Treatment: A Critique of Revisions in 
Procedural, Substantive, and Dispositional Criteria in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 39 Vand. 
L. Rev. 83, 87 (1986). 
19
 Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 581, 584. 
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with adequate facilities and treatment options, the individual and public benefits from the 
protection afforded by that environment and treatment.
20
 By committing an individual who has a 
mental illness and treating him with effective medication under its power of parens patriae and 
police power, the state is able to ensure that the individual is receiving helpful treatment, 
fulfilling the goals of our civil commitment system.
21
  This should also be the goal of forced 
institutionalization under an SVP statute: to ensure the safety of the community while effectively 
treating the committed individual
22
 in hopes of eliminating or controlling the reason for their 
commitment to allow them to reenter society safely. On one hand the goal of civil commitment is 
to keep the individual and society safe. This goal creates tension with the proposed dual purpose 
of commitment (public safety and receiving treatment). These competing goals make the reality 
of receiving effective treatment dim.  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionally required treatment 
standard. The standard for treatment of civilly committed individuals once they are 
institutionalized was elucidated in Youngberg v. Romeo.
23
 In Youngberg, the Court held that the 
proper standard for determining whether a state adequately had protected the rights of those 
                                                 
20
 Manahan, supra n.7 at 7. 
21
 Id. 
22
  Although treatment does not eliminate sexual crime, research supports the view that treatment 
can decrease the likelihood of future sex offenses and protect potential victims. However, given 
the limitations in scientific knowledge and accuracy of outcome data, as well as the potential 
high human costs of prognostic uncertainty, any commitment to a social project substituting 
treatment for imprisonment of sexual aggressors must be accompanied by vigorous research. 
Grossman, Are Sex Offenders Treatable? A Research Overview ,Psychiatric Services 1999. See 
also, Olver, M. E., & Wong, S. P. (2009). Therapeutic Responses of Psychopathic Sexual 
Offenders: Treatment Attrition, Therapeutic Change, and Long-Term Recidivism. 77 J. Consult. 
Clin. Psychol. 328-336 (2009) (“Overall, the results suggest that given appropriate treatment 
interventions, sex offenders with significant psychopathic traits can be retained in an institutional 
treatment program and those showing therapeutic improvement can reduce their risk for both 
sexual and violent recidivism”). 
23
 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,307  (1982). 
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civilly committed was whether the medical professionals at the facility in fact had exercised 
professional judgment where the individual was committed.
24
 The Court found that qualified 
professional judgment was entitled to a presumption of correctness and that liability could be 
imposed only when a treatment decision represented such a substantial departure from accepted 
professional judgment as to demonstrate that the decision had not been based on professional 
judgment.
25
 The Court left the decision regarding what constituted accepted professional 
judgment largely to the discretion of medical professionals and medical authorities, because 
courts, judges, and juries are not in a position to second guess experts on matters on which they 
are better informed.
26
 While the Court has recognized a range of procedural requirements that 
protect the civil liberty interests of persons subject to civil commitment, it has also increasingly 
given recognition to treatment and clinical rights of persons involuntarily committed to mental 
health facilities.
27
 On the other hand, many legislatures and courts have focused only on the civil 
liberty interests of persons subject to involuntary civil commitment,
28
 leaving the treatment 
concerns to meet the minimum standards set out in Youngberg, creating competing goals for 
civil commitment across state lines.  
A major concern coming out of the court decisions and legislation regarding traditional 
civil commitment is that those individuals that are seriously mentally ill may not be meeting the 
commitment threshold (i.e. posing an imminent danger to the community) and are too mentally 
                                                 
24
 Id. at 307. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id.  
27
 see generally Monahan, Three Lingering Issues in Patient Rights, in PSYCHIATRIC 
PATIENT RIGHTS AND PATIENT ADVOCACY: ISSUES AND EVIDENCE 264-65 (B. 
Bloom & S. Asher eds. 1982) (examining the differences both in nature and success in advocacy 
of procedural and treatment rights) 
28
 Hermann supra n. 18 at 106. 
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ill to recognize that they need to consent to treatment.
29
 The Court has emphasized that civil 
committees such as in the case of Youngberg v. Romeo, where Romeo was neither charged with 
nor convicted of a crime, are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of 
confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.
30
 This 
creates a treatment dichotomy in which who that may have committed crimes because of their 
mental illness do not receive the same treatment as those individuals that have been found to be a 
danger to themselves or the community before their actions resulted in criminal sanctions.
31
 This 
is the inherent problem that those committed under SVP statutes face. Some have committed 
morally reprehensible crimes and some like Derrick S., are sympathetic characters that while 
having a criminal conviction, are subjected to a broken system.
32
 They are individuals that need 
access to mental health service yet do not appear to be receiving treatment with the end goal of 
improving their mental health to be reintegrated into society. Some would say that the language 
in Youngberg strongly suggests that there is no broad constitutional right to treatment for persons 
                                                 
29
David T. Simpson, Jr., Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment: The Dangerousness Standard and 
Its Problems, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 241, 241 (1984). 
30
 Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement 
of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 319, 343 (2003). 
31
 The Kansas Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks recognized that, whereas civil commitment 
under Kansas’s general civil commitment law for the mentally ill comported with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Foucha by requiring evidence of “mental illness,” Kansas v. 
Hendrick, 521 U.S. 346,358 (1997): the KSVPA departed from Foucha by allowing civil 
commitment based not on mental illness but rather on “antisocial personality features which are 
unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities”, Zander, supra n. 8. 
32
  Derrik committed his sexual crime when he was a minor, the testing that can allow an 
individual to be labeled treated with a low recidivism rate considers such factors as living in the 
same home as a lover for at least two year (see Static –99R code form), considering that he was a 
minor he was unable to meet this requirement and get a 1 instead of a 0 for this category. The 
higher point value indicated on the Static 99 means a higher potential for reoffense.  
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involuntarily confined as dangerous and mentally impaired, at least where no acceptable 
treatment exists or where they cannot be successfully treated for their afflictions.
33
  
This treatment dichotomy can bee seen in the Supreme Court’s decision in Foucha v. 
Louisiana.
34
 Terry Foucha was found guilty by reason of mental insanity and was civilly 
committed to a facility.
35
 Doctors at the state facility had found that Foucha had an antisocial 
personality disorder, a condition that is not a mental disease and is untreatable. The state 
Supreme Court found that under Louisiana’s statutory scheme confinement of an insanity 
acquittee based on dangerousness alone was allowed.
36
  In reversing Louisiana’s supreme court, 
the United States Supreme Court reversed and ruled that potential dangerousness was not a 
justification to retain a person found not guilty by reason of insanity if no mental illness was 
present. The Court also held that, as a matter of due process, he was entitled to release when he 
had recovered his sanity or was no longer dangerous.
37
 This would mean that the court does not 
envision indefinite commitment under traditional civil commitment and that at least part of the 
goal of civil commitment is to treat the mental illness since dangerousness was not enough to 
keep Foucha committed. Individuals committed under SVP acts can be committed for “mental 
abnormalities,” one of which is anti-social personality disorder, which is “notoriously difficult to 
treat”38 and is “essentially a way of being.”39 The definition of antisocial personality disorder 
highlights that the reason for which a sexually violent predator faces indefinite commitment is 
                                                 
33
 Janus & Logan, supra n. 30 at 384. 
34
 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 71 (1992). 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Mayo Clinic, Antisocial Personality Disorder, available at accessed 11\19\12, 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/antisocial-personality-
disorder/DS00829/DSECTION=treatments-and-drugs. (last accessed Nov. 19, 2012). 
39
 Id.  
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because of the aspect of dangerousness. This suggests that states with SVP acts are not interested 
in treating mental illness\conditions but instead focus on what may happen upon release.
40
 The 
section below will clearly show that SVP statutes have a primarily to protect the public and not 
to treat the committed individuals. States refer to SVPs as “the worst of the worst,”41 and 
presenting dangers and risks to the community.
42
 The dual purpose of public protection and 
treatment is not a reality.  
II HISTORY AND VARIATIONS OF SVP ACTS IN THE US 
In the United States there are 20 states that have adopted SVP statutes in addition to the 
federal government.
43
  As of 2006, when only 17 states possessed SVP laws, over 4,500 
individuals had been committed under their provisions with only 494 offenders having been 
released once they were confined.
44
  This created a release rate of just under 11 percent of the 
                                                 
40
 In State v. Randall, the ability to hold someone on dangerousness alone was upheld however, 
ultimately, the court held that an insanity acquittee may be held in an institution as long as he/she 
is still dangerous, to the extent the time does not exceed the maximum time that could have been 
imposed if the acquittee had been sentenced to prison. State v. Randall, 532 N.W.2d at 94,94 
(Wis. 2d 1995) see also David L. Shaprio, Ethical Dilemmas for the Mental Health Professional: 
Issues Raised by Recent Supreme Court Decisions  34 Cal. W. L. Rev. 1 (1997). This is clearly 
different in the context of SVPs who are held after they have completed a full prison sentence for 
their crimes.  
41
 “The worst of the worst” is the term used to describe Sexually Violent Predators by Riverside 
County, California District Attorney Rod Pacheco. Keith Matheny, Areas Fear 
Predators’ Releases, USA Today, Mar. 4, 2010, at 3A (outlining difficulties surrounding 
supervised release of sexually violent predators). 
42
 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01 (1994); N.Y. MHY Law § 10.01 (2009); Wash. Rev. Code § 
71.09.010 (1992). 
43
Dan Krauss, John McCabe & Joel Lieberman Dangerously Misunderstood: Representative 
Jurors’ Reactions  to Expert Testimony on Future Dangerousness in Sexually Violent Predator 
Trial, Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, July 25, 2011, at 1, available at 
http://www.cgu.edu/pdffiles/sbos/krauss_dangerously_misunderstood.pdf  
44
Kathy Gookin Comparison of State Laws Authorizing Involuntary Commitment of Sexually 
Violent Predators Washington State Institute for 
Public Policy Aug. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/07-08-1101.pdf 
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committed population.
45
 Civil rights lawyers have argued, several states have held that SVP 
statutes are an unconstitutional form of preventive detention, double jeopardy, and/or 
punishment without due process. Two cases
46
 made it to the US Supreme Court and, despite 
amicus briefs from the American Psychological Association in opposition, the Court has twice 
accepted the constitutionality of the SVP statutes.
47
 
One of the first of these SVP laws to be enacted and reviewed by the Supreme Court was 
enacted by Kansas.
48
 LeRoy Hendricks, who had been convicted and sentenced for sexually 
molesting children, challenged this statue in 1996.
49
 Hendricks challenged the Kansas SVP 
statute on grounds of due process. In Kansas v. Hendricks,
50
 the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas 
delivering the opinion of the court, held that:  the Act's definition of “mental abnormality” 
satisfied substantive due process requirements for civil commitment, the Act did not establish 
“criminal” proceedings, and involuntary confinement pursuant to Act was not punitive, thus 
precluding finding of any double jeopardy or ex post facto violation.
51
 
 With the constitutionality of the Kansas SVP statute being upheld, similar acts have been 
enacted in 19 other states.
52
 The programs in these states, however, are not identical,  this 
analysis concerns itself with the programs in Kansas, Texas, California, and New Jersey. 
                                                 
45
 This number was arrived at using data from the previous sentence, comparing the release of 
494 individuals in comparison to 4500 individuals committed under SVP statutes. The actual 
number is 10.978%.  
46
 This refers to Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane. Kansas v. Crane, further affirmed the 
constitutionality of the SVP laws, and allowed a broader interpretation of volitional control than 
Hendricks, by clarifying that complete inability to control behavior is not required (Kansas v. 
Crane, 534 US 407 (2002).   
47
 Frances, Allen, and Shoba Sreenivasan. Sexually Violent Predator Statutes: The Clinical/Legal 
Interface. Psychiatric Times 25.14 (2008). 
48
 Zander, supra n. 8 at 22. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350.  
51
 Id. 
52
  Kraus, supra, note 4. 
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Although the predominant motivation for SVP commitment laws is incapacitation, states 
uniformly promise treatment as an ancillary purpose. Indeed, it is this “treatment” purpose that 
marks the high-security, long-term incapacitation characteristic of SVP regimes as non-punitive, 
and insulates them from constitutional challenge. Yet, in practice, the promised treatment most 
often goes unredeemed. 
53
 These four states highlight the differences that have arisen in the 
formulation of SVP treatment programs. These differences are due in part to the deference given 
to the states in the formulation of their SVP statutes and from the Supreme Court decision in 
Hendricks set forth an imprecise constitutional standard on treatment.
54
  
A. THE KANSAS STATUTE 
In Kansas, a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) is a sex offender who has a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder and a charge or conviction for a sexually violent offense.
55
 
SVPs are different than other sex offenders because they are at a higher risk to re-offend if their 
mental abnormality or personality disorder is left untreated.
56
 In Kansas an individual committed 
under the SVP act is housed at Larned State Hospital.
57
 There are seven steps of the treatment 
program including five inpatient and two outpatient phases.
58
 There is no time limit for 
completion of each phase.
59
 The offender must meet the predetermined requirements of the phase 
to advance.
60
 Since the program’s genesis 16 years ago,61only two people have earned final 
                                                 
53
Janus, supra note 30 at 321. 
54
 Zander, supra note 8 at 24.  
55
 Kansas Dept. Of Corrections, January 2011, available at 
http://www.doc.ks.gov/victimservices/brochures/SVP%20Brochure%20Jan%202011.pub.pdf. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Kansa Dept. of Corrections. supra n. 55 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id.  
61
 As of November 2010. 
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release, according to state records, 16 people earned conditional release or were released by a 
state judge for other reasons and 15 others died in the program.
62
 
Compared with the other states examined here,
63
 the Kansas model is relatively 
straightforward. This is because the Kansas program for custody and treatment is more heavily 
dependent on the Department of Corrections for its day-to-day operations
64
 than any of the six 
programs.
65
 As a practical matter, the treatment program, located within the Larned Correctional 
Mental Health Facility, relies on the DOC for facility security, food, transportation, and medical 
care – virtually everything with the exception of delivery of the treatment program.66 
B. THE TEXAS STATUTE 
In Texas, the SVP statute was deemed needed because the existing involuntary 
commitment provisions of Subtitle C, Title 7,
67
 were inadequate to address the risk of repeated 
predatory behavior that sexually violent predators pose to society.  The legislature further found 
that treatment modalities for sexually violent predators are different from the traditional 
treatment modalities for persons appropriate for involuntary commitment. Thus, the legislature 
found that a civil commitment procedure for the long-term supervision and treatment of sexually 
                                                 
62
 Larry Seward, Is the Kansas Program treating sexual predators or making them worse?, 
Kansas City Action News Article, Nov. 3, 2010, available 
at  http://www.kshb.com/dpp/news/crime/is-ks-program-treating-or-perverting-sexual-
predators#ixzz2AiQVb94Y 
63
 Analysis relied on is by Andrew Harris and his report cited below 
64
 Andrew Harris, A Prospective Analysis of Sexually Violent Predator  Civil Commitment 
Policies, (Doctoral Dissertation), Robert F. Wagner School of Public Justice, New York, NY, 
Sept. 2003 
65
 The six programs reviewed in the study were Wisconsin, Kansas, California, Florida, 
Washington, Minnesota. 
66
 Harris. supra n. 64 . 
67
 Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 574.001-.203(1999). 
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violent predators was necessary and in the interest of the state. 
68
 Unlike all of the other states 
that have SVP acts, Texas’ program is focused exclusively on the use of outpatient treatment and 
supervision as an alternative to the route of inpatient commitment.
69
 The individual is held until 
trial on the petition for civil commitment. There is no probable cause hearing built into the Texas 
scheme,
70
 because the statute does not anticipate detaining the respondent in an inpatient facility. 
Thus, the basic loss of liberty inherent in a typical inpatient commitment is not present.
71
 In this 
sense, the Texas statute is at the forefront of developments in this area of the law nationally and 
provides another option for those states considering the enactment of laws for civil commitment 
of sexually violent predators.
72
  
Compared to the release of individuals that are committed under the Kansas program, the 
treatment and release of individuals under the Texas program is much higher.  As of October 1, 
2011, there were 224 sexually violent predators that have been committed under Health & Safety 
Code Chapter 841.
73
  Of the 224 that were committed, 125 reside in the community and 99 are 
awaiting release from the Texas Department of Criminal Justice into the treatment program. 
74
 
Furthermore, the Texas law has attempted to develop an effective balance in the area of the civil 
commitment of the sexually violent predator. Outpatient supervision and treatment in all 
practical terms can lend itself to greater actual psychotherapeutic intervention and some 
                                                 
68
 Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann., § 841 (1999). 
69
 Rahn Bailey, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: A Unique Texas Approach, 
30 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law,525, 525–32 (2002). 
70
 Tex. Health & Safety Code, supra, n. 68. 
71
 Bailey, supra, n. 69 at 526. 
72
 Id.  
73
 Texas Civil Commitment-Outpatient Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Program (OSVPTP) 
Health & Safety Code, Chapter 841, available at http://www.ovsom.texas.gov/docs/Texas-Civil-
Commitment-OutpatientSVP.pdf. 
74
 Texas Civil Commitment, supra n. 73. 
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psychiatrists question the validity and effectiveness of treatment during incarceration.
75
 These 
higher release rates tend to show that the Texas program’s course of treatment affords the 
committed individual a greater access to mental health services that actually could aid in treating 
the conditions that caused these individuals to offend in the first place and to prevent re-offense. 
The statistics from Texas have shown that as of October 1, 2011, none of the SVPs committed to 
the program have been charged with or convicted of a new sexual crime,
76
which represents a 0 
percent sexual recidivism rate.
77
 
C. THE CALIFORNIA STATUTE 
Involuntary commitment of sexual offenders to state hospitals in California dates back to 
the early 20
th
 century.
78
  The “sexual psychopath laws” were indeterminate criminal sentences 
that allowed for commitment to state psychiatric hospitals for as long as the individual was 
deemed a threat to society.
79
 The purpose was to help sexual offenders by curing them in a 
shorter time than they would serve in prisons, and to protect society against release of sexual 
offenders who had not been cured within the maximum incarceration sentence.
80
 In California, 
the Sexual Psychopath Law was replaced in favor of the Mentally Disordered Sexual Offender 
(MDSO) Law
81
 in 1944, with the MDSO law being repealed in January 1982. 
82
 
                                                 
75
 Bailey, supra n. 69, 53. 
76
 This is not to say that there were not instances of the individuals re-offending, 38% percent, 68 
SVPs, have committed a non-sexual offense and been returned to prison. 
77
 Texas Civil Commitment, supra n. 73. 
78
 Deidre M D’Orazio et al., The California Sexually Violent Predator Statute: History, 
Description & Areas for Improvement, Cal. Coalition on Sexual Offending, Jan. 2009, at 5, 
available at http://ccoso.org/papers/CCOSO%20SVP%20Paper.pdf 
79
 Id. 
80
 Id. D’Orazio, supra¸ n. 78; see also, Dangerous Sexual Offenders: A Task Force Report of the 
American Psychiatric Association  (1st ed. 1999). 
81
 The MDSO statute provided for the diversion from prison to forensic state psychiatric 
hospitals of those individuals whose sexual crimes were deemed to be due to a mental disorder. 
The treatment goal was to reduce risk to such an extent that the individual was felt to be safe for 
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Developing out of this attention to a subgroup of criminals, the California Legislature passed the 
SVP Act as a component of the Welfare and Institutions Code
83
 to address the concern expressed 
in the preamble of the legislation; specifically, according to the state, “a small but extremely 
dangerous (number of) sexually violent predators exist.”84 California’s SVP statute was closely 
modeled after that of the first state to enact an SVP statute, Washington state (1990). Persons 
committed as SVPs have been previously convicted of specified sex offenses against one or more 
victims and have been determined to have a diagnosed mental disorder that makes it likely that 
they will engage in sexually violent predatory behavior upon release into the community.
85
 
Unlike all of the other statutes, except for Texas, which only has an outpatient program, an SVP 
in California cannot be held for more than two years, unless a subsequent extended commitment 
is obtained from the court by the granting of a new petition for commitment.
86
 
 In terms of treatment, California again differs slightly from other state statutes as the 
statute focuses on treating the prevalence of re-offense as oppose to curing the sexual offender.
87
 
The program focuses around this relapse prevention idea and focuses on "offense specific" 
treatment components; that is, treatment components will be geared toward the identification and 
                                                                                                                                                             
release. See generally Sturgeon, V. H. & Taylor, J., Report of a 5-year Follow-up Study of 
Mentally Disordered Sexual Offenders Released From Atascadero State Hospital in 1973Crim. 
Justice Journal, 4, 31-74 (1980). California’s statutes have generally acknowledged the 
dangerousness of these individuals but sought to provide treatment in order to reduce recidivism 
rates. 
82D’Orazio, supra, n. 78 at 7. 
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modification of risk factors for sexual offending.
88
 Like other states with SVP statues, California 
utilizes a phase system.
89
 There are four inpatient phases; each with specific requirements and 
phase five is an outpatient supervised patient reintegration program. 
90
 Compared to the release 
rates in Kansas and the zero percent recidivism rate of the Texas program, California’s results 
seem to fall somewhere in the middle. Since the program’s genesis, 95 of the 558 total 
committed SVPs have earned final release.
91
 This is above the national average (11 percent), 
accounting for a release rate of just over 17 percent.
92
 There has been no study specifically on the 
95 individuals that have been reintegrated into society. However, there was a study regarding the 
treatment model that is employed in California. The Sexual Offender Treatment and Evaluation 
Project
93
 looked at the relapse prevention model that is currently incorporated into California’s 
SVP treatment program. 
94
 A positive treatment effect was revealed when the treatment groups 
were separated into two groups, those who “got it”95 and those who were assessed to have failed 
to meet the treatment objectives.
96
 The “got it” group had recidivism rates 50 percent less than 
those assessed to have not met the treatment program objectives.
97
  These results
98
 are not 
                                                 
88
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89
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90
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91
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92
 Gookin, supra,  n. 43; see also D’Orazio, supra, n. 77 at 2 (comparing the individuals that are 
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93
 The Sex Offender Treatment and Evaluation Project is a six-year clinical research program 
specifically mandated by the California State Legislature 
94
 D’Orazi supra n. 78 at 11. 
95
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96
 Marques, et al., Effects of a Relapse Prevention program on Sexual Recidivism: Final Results 
from California’s Sexual Offender Treatment and Evaluation Project, 17 Sexual Abuse: A 
Journal of Research and Treatment, 179-107 (2005) 
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dispositive but in combination with the results of the Texas outpatient treatment program, tend to 
show that a relapse prevention model and outpatient program where individuals can work 
through phases and are not committed for indefinite amounts of time can have positive effects on 
recidivism rates.  Focusing the treatment program on relapse prevention and outpatient programs 
where the SVP is exposed to real life triggers has had a positive correlation on recidivism rates 
and should be taken into account when reviewing the mental health services provided to the 
individual subject to the SVP statute.  
D. THE NEW JERSEY STATUTE 
 The statue in New Jersey, The Sexually Violent Predator Act,
99
 defines a sexually violent 
predator as an individual who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and suffers from a 
mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of 
sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and treatment.
100
 To qualify 
as a SVP, an individual need not suffer from “mental illness,” as defined for purposes of general 
civil commitment
101
 instead, he must have a mental abnormality or personality disorder that may 
or may not constitute “mental illness,” coupled with a criminal conviction or finding of legal 
insanity or trial incompetence.
102
 The origins of the New Jersey statute come from its traditional 
                                                                                                                                                             
me that it would be likely that those that were committed to mandatory treatment for at least two 
years would be less likely to reoffend, serving the dual purpose of providing mental health 
services to the individual and protection to the public.  
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civil commitment statute that was expanded
103
 in 1994 and upheld after In the Matter of D.C.
104
 
In affirming the commitment, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the new definition of 
mental illness was clearly intended to apply to released sexual offenders like D.C. who needed to 
be involuntarily detained for public safety.
105
 
 It is through the Department of Health Services that the committed individuals under the 
statute in New Jersey receive treatment at the Sexual Treatment Unit (STU). The treatment 
provided in the New Jersey facility follows the relapse prevention model, with phase 
designations.
106
 In order to regain his liberty,
107
 even conditionally, the ex-offender must 
establish that he has been successfully treated for the mental abnormality or personality disorder 
that was the basis for his confinement to the STU.
108
 The primary mental health treatment 
provided to committees is a form of group therapy administered in “process groups,” 
supplemented by psycho-educational “modules” devoted to topics such as victim empathy, 
relapse prevention, and arousal reconditioning.
109
 
 Recent data show that from 1999 through the end of March 2012, only 69 of the 580 men 
committed to the STU (less than 12 percent) were discharged to the community, in most cases 
subject to stringent conditions including parole supervision and community-based therapy. This 
release rate falls just below the national average and it appears from the data that the majority of 
                                                 
103
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the men that were released did not sexually reoffend as they would have been transferred back to 
the facility.
110
 These numbers may seem encouraging and along the lines of the result seen in 
Texas’s with regard to recidivism rates however, more than half of the men that were released to 
the community were committed within the first three years that the facility was open.
111
 It was 
only after between ten and 13 years they were able to receive enough therapy to receive a phase 
designation for four or five and gains final release.
112
 
 The treatment provided under the New Jersey statute appears to be more extensive than in 
Kansas but the numbers of release and recidivism seem to suggest that it is less effective
113
 than 
the treatment received in California and Texas. What one can take away from the review of these 
statutes is that they provide a wide array of treatment, both effective and ineffective. More than 
one statue’s primary goal and seemingly only goal is protection of the public. The reality of 
treatment is overlooked if it means these individuals will not be released, preventing them from 
ever reoffending.  
III.  THE CURRENT STATE OF BIOETHICS AND MENTAL ILLNESS 
The revolutionary import of bioethics was to shift moral agency away from physicians to 
patients, and to introduce moral perspectives from outside of medicine.
114
 In recent years there 
has been little focus on how bioethical principles should be used to intervene into mental health 
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services,
115
 in particular there has been virtually no attention given to the ethical implications of 
the lack of treatment given to the individuals convicted under SVP statutes. While mental illness 
is not completely missing from the public discussions, literature, and texts of bioethics, it tends 
to be marginalized much as mental health is in relation to physical health care.
116
 
One scholar suggests that the reasons that ethical issues associated with mental illness 
have generally been neglected in literature and texts of the discipline of bioethics centers around 
three main issues: changes in the delivery system of mental health services, conflicting ethical 
theories, and finally the stigma that is associated with mental illness. 
117
 
The delivery of mental health services was dramatically changed after World War II and 
continued through the 1970s, with the deinstitutionalization of persons with mental illness and 
the introduction of community-based outpatient treatment.
118
 The deinstitutionalization was 
driven in part by court rulings and in part by emergence of the community mental health 
movement, which challenged the therapeutic efficacy of hospitalization in the process of 
treatment and recovery from mental illness and the emergence of mental health advocacy 
groups.
119
 Deinstitutionalization changed the preeminent model of delivery services into a 
community based treatment approach that involves a number of different medical services 
provided by a variety of medical professionals.
120
 It is this movement toward a community-based 
model that has left bioethics without a seat at the table. Bioethics moved from the fringes of the 
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academic world to the forefront by pursuing institution-based opportunities.
121
 With the 
movement away from treating mental health services in these types of institutions, bioethicists do 
not have a platform to comment on the state of mental illness.  
The second contributing factor to the lack of scholarship on the ethics of mental illness is 
the conflicting ethical principles that could be applied in this area. The conflict largely centers 
around the positive and negative implications of applying a paternalistic approach and relying on 
autonomy. Autonomy is commonly understood to be the principle that independent actions and 
choices of the individual should not be constrained by others.
122
 Paternalism on the other hand, 
in particular medical paternalism, is the interference with the autonomy of patients for their own 
clinical benefit, and was an accepted ethical norm in the history of Western medical ethics and 
was widespread in clinical practice.
123
 
Due to the nature of mental illness and the potential for diminished decision-making 
capacity, autonomy tends to become a contentious issue, rather than ta worthwhile principle in 
bioethical discussions.
124
 The emphasis that autonomy places on rational decision making as the 
necessary and sufficient condition for autonomous moral action becomes a conceptual barrier to 
engagement with the wider range of issues facing the mentally ill because many argue they are 
often not rational individuals.
125
 It can be argued that the coercive treatment of psychiatric 
patients only seemingly conﬂicts with considerations of autonomy, namely in all cases where 
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patients are not capable of making autonomous decisions
126
 however, given the paternalistic 
nature of the commitment statutes being discussed, it is clear that society’s goal is inherently 
paternalistic. Accordingly there are occasions when people should be treated paternalistically in 
the interest of others and if it means that the paternalistic intervention could make the individual 
better: allowing him or her to make autonomous choices.
127
 The tension between these two 
approaches creates a divide where bioethicists do not have a unified voice to speak on the issue.  
 Compounding the issue of autonomy versus paternalism is the stigma that is often 
associated with mental illness and the public response. Even with the evolution of other theories 
of bioethics (feminism, caustrity, narrative) there has not been an increased amenability to the 
study of mental illness from a bioethics framework.
128
People with mental illness are often seen 
by the general public as lazy, as individuals that can help themselves yet do not do so.
129
  Stigma 
is also a contributing factor in the chronic underfunding of public mental health services and in 
the disparities of coverage in private insurance plans.
130
  The stigma attaches most directly to 
persons with mental illness, but there is a wider stigmatizing effect on people who are associated 
with persons with mental illness.
131
 This stigma presents the final barrier that bioethics must 
overcome in order to become more engaged in the discussion of mental illness. As the scholar   
Janet Nelson aptly puts it “mental illness, despite the many recent advances in scientific under- 
standing and medical treatment, retains about it the musty and unpleasant aura of the asylum—
and no one, from bioethicists to the mentally ill themselves, cares to visit that place if it can be 
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avoided.”132 
IV. BIOETHICS, MENTAL ILLNESS, AND THE SVP TREATMENT PARADIGM 
 In order for bioethics to become engaged in mental health issues it must first overcome the 
stigma that is involved in treating societally unpopular individuals.
133
 Bioethics is a field that 
answers difficult and often unpopular questions, looking at the rights, obligations, privileges and 
relationships of people.
134
 To start to overcome the stigma that is associated with mental illness, 
bioethics can begin by looking at mental illness through the lens of public health and health 
disparity prevalent in developing countries. This acts as a way for bioethicists to begin a 
dialogue, a key step to overcoming the stigma of treating the mentally ill and discussing their 
conditions. Traditionally speaking, bioethicists tend to focus their attention on those areas where 
they can demonstrate how to exercise virtue.
135
 The mentally ill are a group that suffers and their 
suffering often goes unnoticed, this is an area where bioethics and bioethicist have made a 
difference in the past and clearly fits the model for discussion.
136
 
 By overcoming the stigma and asserting its presence in the filed of mental illness, 
bioethicists can develop a new understanding of autonomy that can greatly benefit the mentally 
ill. Autonomy should move away from the focus on the rational aspect of the definition and 
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instead seek to empower
137
 the individual with the power to be educated about and make choices 
regarding their own mental health treatment. This concept includes certain positive rights such as 
having decision-making power, access to information and resources, and a range of options from 
which to make choices and a continuous conversation about those choices. 
138
    
Even those people with severe mental illnesses, including some people who are 
experiencing active psychotic episodes, are not so impaired that they are incapable 
of understanding a proposed medical treatment.
139
 They might refuse treatment for their 
psychotic symptoms on the basis of unlikely or even obviously false belief that they are not ill.
140
 
Such beliefs do not necessarily make them incapable of comprehending the proposed 
treatment.
141
 Providing that through discussion a severely mentally ill person can have an 
understanding of the consequences of refusing treatment, this furthers the ultimate goal of 
promoting autonomous decisions. This new understanding of autonomy helps to ensure that 
someone who refuses treatment does so because refusing treatment is consistent with his own 
goals and desires. Provided that the individual is not a danger to himself or others, his mental 
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illness should not prevent him from deciding what course of treatment, if any, he wishes to 
pursue. 
 Bioethics should look to areas where it can become involved in a way that has been 
successful in the past. Bioethics took a firm stance in the early years of mental illness treatment 
because of the harsh methods used in institutional facilities, the lack of consent of the patients 
housed in those facilities and the overall mistreatment that institutionalized patients had to deal 
with in the early years of mental health treatment.
142
 Following this model would mean that a 
bioethicist would sit on the board of facility that treats the mentally ill or would be allowed 
access to that facility in order to make ethical determinations. The civil commitment process 
creates a place where bioethicist can follow a model that works. In particular the bioethicist 
could look at the treatment of an underserved (although unpopular population) of sex offenders. 
Examining the treatment and the facilities where SVP are committed would allow bioethicists to 
focus on the suffering inherent in being committed in a system that requires an individual to 
move through treatment modules. In order to move through those phases or treatment modules 
they have to have treatment, yet, the treatment they receive is sub-standard and they become 
trapped in this seemingly never ending cycle.  
 A commitment facility would provide fertile ground to further the discussion on the ethical 
treatment of committed SVPs. Given that the dual purpose for commitment under SVP statutes is 
community protection and to aid the individual, providing adequate mental health services will 
allow both goals to be accomplished. Treating these individuals of their mental afflictions 
reduces the risk to the community and serves the goals of paternalism. While the goals of 
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paternalism may not have the best interest of the patient in mind, they do have the interest of 
society at large. Allowing this balance between SVP treatment and public safety is essential to 
instituting a new treatment model. 
143
 When a real tragedy occurs, the media and politicians will 
interpret the tragedy as a failure to use the SVP tool broadly enough. Moves will be made to 
broaden the SVP net.
144
 The public needs assurances that allowing for variations in treatment 
will not put themselves or their children at risk and a bioethicist needs room to encourage 
changes to the treatment system, making the balancing of these competing goals paramount to 
ensuring that SVP acts are not broadened and treatment does not suffer.  
 While there are arguments that treatment will not work for sex offenders, as noted 
previously in this paper, there is not conclusive evidence on either side
145
 and the effectiveness 
of treatment is highly controversial.
146
 However, research generally indicates that rehabilitative 
programs can help sex offenders control their impulses and reduce their likelihood of 
reoffending.
147 
Specifically, studies indicate that the recidivism rate for sex offenders receiving 
treatment was nineteen percent, compared to a twenty-seven percent rate for non-
treated sex offenders.
148
 For some particular sexual afflictions (paraphilia and pedophilia) there 
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is evidence that a relapse prevention model can reduce rates for recidivism.
149
 This would 
provide a place where bioethics can encourage change. Under the theory of autonomy, if an 
individual is being placed in a facility under the guise of receiving treatment, they should be 
allowed to have access to therapy for those afflictions if there is evidence that it will help. These 
individuals should not be placed in a system that becomes punitive because research on sexual 
deviance is not complete. Bioethicists should promote the theory of non-malfeasance, to do no 
further harm to the committed populations.  
 There will inevitably be those individuals who refuse treatment. Under the current system 
in place in many states, this refusal may because certain treatment programs require that 
offenders recount their sexual offenses, which in turn leads treatment providers, the judicial 
system, and the public to believe that the offenders continue to contemplate sexually violent acts 
and are still dangerous.
150
 It could become the bioethicist role to advocate for the committed SVP 
that engaging in therapy should not result in a punitive outcomes because treatment appears to be 
at least minimally effective, encouraging treatment achieves the statutory and constitutional aims 
of protecting society and caring for mentally ill persons.
151
 Allowing a committed SVP who 
would otherwise refuse treatment due to fear of additional criminal sentencing or a longer stay in 
an SVP facility to choose an outpatient treatment method or treatment with a certain amount of 
privacy protection
152
 would likely increase treatment participation. Appealing to the SVP 
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committee as an autonomous decision maker instead of a criminal heightens the likelihood of the 
SVP committee choosing treatment.  
 Finally, there would likely be arguments against providing treatment because it costs too 
much. However, the Texas program proves that treatment can prevent recidivism and the cost per 
individual in the Texas program is 17,000, which is 77,000 less than the national average.
153
 The 
cost of the SVP system is not only witnessed in providing care in an institutionalized 
atmosphere, but is evidenced in budget cuts in certain states. These budget cuts, in an attempt to 
protect the public by keeping SVPs from reentering society have come at a high price. Some 
states have taken measures like reducing the number of probation officers and cutting funds to 
domestic violence and sexual violence prevention programs.
154
  As more and more resources 
pour into SVP programs, the distortion in policy and resource allocation will become more and 
more severe. Society will suffer because of the resource drain, and victims will suffer as more 
resources are drawn away from programs that address the great bulk of sexual violence in the 
community.
155
 
The cost of providing treatment can be defended under bioethical principles regarding 
access to healthcare, beneficence, and a sense of justice. If SVP statues want to have provisions 
regarding treatment of the individual then they should have to subscribe to a duty of fairness and 
                                                 
153
  Gookin, supra n. 43 at 5. The cost for the Texas program is 17, 391 per individual while the 
national average is 94, 017 per individual.  
154
  In 2004, California spent more than $78 million to lock up 535 predators, while at the same 
time providing “no substantial sex offender treatment for the seventeen thousand sex offenders in 
its prisons.” Eric S. Janus, Failure to Protect: America's Sexual Violent Predator Laws and the 
Rise of the Preventive State 1, 115 (2006). Similarly, in 2004, Minnesota spent $26 million to 
lock up 235 predators. That same year, pecuniary problems forced the state to propose cutting 
137 of its 778 police officers and actually to eliminate 100 probation officer positions despite 
rising caseloads, and it cut its funding for domestic violence and sexual violence prevention 
programs by $3.6 million per year. Tamara Rice Lave, Controlling Sexually Violent Predators: 
Continued Incarceration at What Cost? 14 New Crim. L. Rev. 213 Spring (2011).  
155
 Janus supra n. 133 at 1250 
   
 29 
give to each committed SVP that treatment that the individual deserves. By creating an 
outpatient program, which will cost lest than institutionalization, focus can be on individual 
triggers and therapy. This then allows states that are considering budget cuts in other areas to 
continue to employ corrections officers and provide funding to sexual violence prevention 
programs. This cost shifting then becomes mutually beneficial: allowing each state to treat the 
afflicted SVP while cutting its budget and potentially seeing the zero percent recidivism Texas 
has seen using this out-patient approach.  
CONCLUSION 
 Bioethics should focus on individuals committed under SVP statutes in order to draw 
awareness to the lack of treatment they receive. Treatment should be improved and varied in 
these programs, as it would lead to lower cost and likely a lower rate of recidivism. Following 
the Texas model would allow for patient autonomy while still serving the interest of the state by 
protecting citizens. Allowing a new understanding of autonomy to take root would likely greatly 
advance the conditions within SVP facilities and make great steps toward allowing both the 
mentally ill and sexually violent predators to choose and receive treatment to become productive 
members of society.  
 
 
 
 
 
